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equilibrium model of wages and unemployment. We solve for the dynamics of wages and 
unemployment under conditions of downward wage rigidity, where forward looking firms take 
into account these constraints. Using simulated productivity data based on the post-war US 
economy, we analyse the ability of the model to match certain stylised labour market facts. 
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1 Introduction
Truman Bewley has argued that there are two key features constraining wage cuts for
new hires in recessions (Bewley (1999a)). Because wage cuts for incumbents will have
a negative impact on morale, rms avoid them under all but extreme circumstance; at
the same time while new hires may be willing to work at a lower wage than that paid to
incumbents, paying them less would disrupt internal equity and so their wages will be set
at the same level as incumbents:
New employees, in contrast, feel it is inequitable to be paid according to a
scale lower than the one that applied to colleagues that were hired earlier. For
this reason, downward pay rigidity for new hires exists only because the pay
of existing employees is rigid. (Bewley (1999b))
Bewleys account mainly concentrates on the question of why rms do not cut wages
in recession. But it raises the important question of how forward looking rms take into
account the fact that such constraints downward rigidity combined with equal treat-
mentof new hires may arise in the future. For example, a rm, anticipating downward
wage rigidity, may temper wage increases in better times.1 Or in more generality, and
supposing that rms can o¤er long-term contracts, the rm must take into account these
equal treatment constraints which may prevent it bringing in new hires at a low wage
in downturns, and also prevent the rm hiring at a higher wage than that o¤ered to in-
cumbents when the labour market is tight.2 What are the implications for wages and
employment in an equilibrium model with forward looking rms and workers?
In order to analyse the dynamic consequences of Bewleys insights, we analyse a model
in which the pay of new hires and existing workers is linked within each rm indeed is
identical, given that we assume all workers are perfect substitutes and in which the pay
of incumbents is subject to some downward rigidity. This rigidity is then transmitted to
the pay of new hires.3 Workers and rms then must anticipate the e¤ects of this, so that
1Note that in the absence of equal treatment, downward rigidity would not normally be an issue (indeed
downward rigid wage contracts are optimal in the environment studied by Beaudry and DiNardo (1991)).
Future new hires would have a contract tailored to their circumstances, and this is independent of devising
an optimal contract for current hires.
2Bringing in workers at higher pay than incumbents is even more problematic; thus while in contrast to
the primary sector Bewley found evidence that new hires are sometimes paid a lower rate than incumbents
in the secondary sector, even there, paying new hires more than incumbents is deemed to be very disruptive
(Bewley (1999a, p. 320)).
3We stress the point that for there to be signicant labour market implications it is necessary that
downward rigidity applies to new hires if it only applies to incumbent workers so that new hires can be
hired at a exible wage, there is no reason why hiring decisions should not be e¢ cient.
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for example an increase in current wages means that future wages cannot be cut below
this level. Despite the enormous literature which exists on downward rigidities, there has
been almost no analysis of the forward looking nature of the decision problem and its
labor market implications (the only exception we are aware of is Elsby (2009), who solves
a problem involving downward nominal rigidities, but in a very di¤erent context).
To do this, we take the equal treatment model of Snell and Thomas (2009) and add an
explicit downward rigidity constraint.4 We do not, it should be stressed, attempt to provide
an explicit foundation for the two constraints.5 In the unrestricted model without the
downward rigidity restriction because of equal treatment of workers rms have to trade-
o¤ the desire to insure their risk-averse workers against the need to respond to market
conditions to not only prevent their workers from quitting, but also to take advantage of
states of the world where labour is cheap. The insurance motive alone provides a degree
of downward rigidity. In this paper we add to this model downward wage restrictions in
the spirit of Bewley to see how the performance of the model changes. A rm will face
not only a sequence of participation constraints if it needs to retain existing, or hire in
new, workers, but also a constraint each period restricting the degree to which it can cut
its wage. A major challenge of the analysis is to solve for an equilibrium in the face of
these constraints.
The equal treatment assumption prevents rms from cutting wages for new entrants,
so that in periods with adverse shocks the wage may not fall su¢ ciently to clear the labour
market. In the absence of equal treatment, wage rigidity in this model (with xed hours)
would not have employment e¤ects, as utilities o¤ered to new entrants would be exible.
We show however that (under certain conditions) rms hire up to the point where the
real wage equals the marginal product of labour; to the extent then that wages do not
correspond to market-clearing levels hiring will be ine¢ cient; in fact we show that this
occurs only in the direction of wages being too high leading to ine¢ ciently low employment
and an excess supply of labour.
For the case where there is no uncertainty (so rms perfectly anticipate all future
productivity changes) we are able to provide a complete characterization of equilibrium
provided that the downward rigidity constraint is not too loose (does not allow too large
a reduction in real wages). In fact this characterization is very simple and intuitive: rst
calculate the spot wage for a particular date with its corresponding productivity level:
4We also extend that model to multiple sectors, an extension which is crucial for addressing recent
empirical evidence.
5Snell and Thomas (2009) show how equal treatment can be endogenised if the contracting environment
is at will and a similar argument could be used here (see also Menzio and Moen (2008)). A related
argument in the insider-outsider context has been made by Gottfries and Sjostrom (2000).
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this is the wage that would clear the labour market in that period if rms were unable to
o¤er long-term contracts. If this lies below the minimum wage for that period, i.e., that
calculated by applying the downward rigidity constraint to the wage in the previous period
(this minimum wage is just the lagged wage if there is complete downward rigidity), then
the wage will be at its minimum level (and there will be unemployment because the wage
is too high, recalling that rms hire on their labour demand curves). On the other hand
if the spot wage in a particular period is above the minimum wage, then the new wage is
simply set to the spot wage and there is no unemployment. Intuitively, in this case, rms
cannot hold wages down because of competitive pressures forcing up the utility that must
be o¤ered to reatin and hire. (They could hold current wages down and promise more in
the future to compensate, but this would be a costlier contract.) Given that the initial
wage is at the spot level, this allows for the model to be solved. Unfortunately this result
doesnt fully generalise to the case with uncertainty, although we present a result for a
two-period model.
Not only do we solve for an equilibrium of a model when forward looking rms have
downward constraints, but we also look at whether the equilibrium wage and unemploy-
ment dynamics look reasonable. We argue that our model, when simulated with sectoral
productivity shocks, is capable of generating simulation results that are reasonably con-
sistent with empirical unemployment and wage movements over the business cycle.
An outline of the paper is as follows. We start by looking at whether ther is evidence
for the equal treatment assumption in Section 2. Then we lay out the basic assumptions
of our model in Section 3 and the next two subsections. In Section 3.1.2 we prove a
simple characterization of the equilibrium when there is no uncertainty. In Section 3.1.3
we discuss to what extent these results extend to the uncertainty case. In Section 4 we
simulate the model using simulated and actual sectoral TFP data from the postwar US
economy to generate predictions of wage and unemployment movements, and see to what
extent these satisfy certain stylised facts. Finally Section 5 contains concluding comments.
2 Evidence for equal treatment
While we simply impose that all workers within a rm mustbe paid the same, we here
briey review the empirical evidence on the issue of equal treatment. An early study was
Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994), who examined the pay of managerial employees in
a single rm over time. They found that incumbentspay tends to move together, but the
pay of entrants is signicantly more variable, suggesting that the pay of new hires may be
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more subject to outside conditions than that of incumbents.However they do not formally
control for composition of entry cohorts, so it is di¢ cult to know what the cause of this
extra variability is. Wachter and Bender (2008) have recently run a similar analysis on
a number of rms in a large German manufacturing sector, and they, too, nd evidence
of substantial and quite persistent entry cohort e¤ects. However these seem to be widely
distributed across rms at any given date, suggesting, as they note, that they are not driven
by cyclical phenomena. A study by Kwon and Milgrom (2005) of Swedish workers nds
that if cohort e¤ects for labor market entry and occupation entry are included in addition
to rm entry cohort e¤ects, the former two are procyclical in line with expectation, while
the latter actually appear countercyclical. In other words, a worker entering the labour
market in a downturn will tend to do worse than those already active, but entering a rm
in a downturn does not of itself lead to a lower wage than that received by incumbents; in
fact the opposite appears to be the case. Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2007) construct a
representative series for US wages of new hires (based on the CPS); in their denition new
hires consist of workers who were without work in the previous 4 months, and consequently
includes those hired from the pool of unemployed along with workers entering from outside
of the labor market. They argue that this series shows substantially more variability than
the comparable one for those who remain in work, and indeed varies roughly one-for-one
with productivity, in line with the basic matching model.6 We do not regard this as fatal
for our assumption however: a higher aggregate variability across sectors of new hire wages
relative to incumbents does not necessarily imply the same is true within each sector, and
certainly does not imply that new hires are treated di¤erently within each rm. We hope
to develop the model to address this issue in the future. In a similar vein, Pissarides (2007)
summarises empirical studies that nd wages for workers who change jobs are considerably
more procyclical than those who remain with the same employer (see Footnote 6). Gertler
and Trigari (2009), however, argue that such studies are not demonstrating that the new
hire wage is more procyclical than a stayers wage within a particular rm. The reason
for the empirical nding could simply be that match quality varies procyclically, and they
6This issue has arisen in the debate since Shimer (2005a) about whether the Mortensen-Pissarides
matching model is capable of generating su¢ cient variability of the vacancies to unemployment ratio from
plausibly sized productivity variations. One answer to this has been to posit that real wages do not vary as
much as the Nash bargaining approach implies, thus giving rise to increased cyclical e¤ects (Hall 2005a).
While this gives a satisfactory theoretical resolution of the di¢ culty, Pissarides (2007) points out that
one can look at the empirical studies to see which story about wages looks more reasonable. Pissarides
also points out that it is the estimated wage elasticity for new matches that should be used in the above
exercise, since it is these wages which determine the protability of a new match and hence drive job
creation. Looking at the cyclicality of wages for workers who change jobs, his conclusion is that the
resolution of positing more rigid wages leads to an empirically implausible degree of wage rigidity, and
one should look elsewhere to resolve this question. However, as argued below, the interpretation of these
empirical studies is open to question.
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present evidence supporting their point of view.
Finally, as discussed above, survey evidence in Bewley (1999a) suggests that violations
of equal treatment are unusual, particularly in the primary sector. Similar ndings exist
for other countries: Managers responded that hiring underbidders would violate their
internal wage policy (Agell and Lundborg (2003, p.7), based on a Swedish survey); in
a British survey, Kaufman (1984) reported that almost all managers viewed bringing in
similarly qualied workers at lower wage rates as infeasible.Akerlof and Yellen (1990)
argue that personnel management texts treat the need for equitable pay as virtually self-
evident.
3 The model
The model is as follows. Time runs from t = 1; 2; 3; : : : ; T , where T  2 is nite, and
there is a single consumption good each period (all wages below are real wages). There
are M equal sized sectors. All workers are assumed to be identical, except for the date at
which they enter the labor market, and the sector to which they are currently associated
(we abstract from any tenure or experience e¤ects on productivity). Workers are risk
averse with per period twice di¤erentiable utility function u(w); u0 > 0; u00 < 0; where
w  0 is the income which must be consumed within the period; it is assumed that they
can neither save nor borrow. There is no disutility of work, but hours are xed so that
workers are either employed or unemployed. Assume that if workers are not employed
in a period, they receive some low consumption level c > 0: There is a large (but xed)
number of identical risk-neutral rms in each sector. A rm in sector m has a diminishing
returns technology where output is Fm(N; st) with @Fm=@N > 0; @2Fm=@N2 < 0; where
N is labour input and st is the current shock (which species current productivity in each
sector). It is assumed that a rm must always employ some (minimum measure of) workers
each period.7 Workers and rms discount the future with common factor  2 (0; 1].
For an employed worker, there is a stayingprobability of  2 (0; 1) ; each period,
with workers exogenously separating with probability 1   ; moreover with probability
 separated workers must seek work at a di¤erent rm and with probability 1    they
die (exit the market); of the surviving separated, a proportion  remain in the same
sector while (1   ) are distributed evenly across sectors. The same death probability of
(1  )(1 ) applies to the unemployed, and likewise (1 ) of the surviving unemployed
move to other sectors. Separation occurs at the end of a period so that separated workers
7This can be motivated by an assumption that rms cannot produce after a period of zero production.
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who do not die but nd a job in the following period do not su¤er any unemployment.
The number dying is replaced by the same number of new entrants, so that each sector
maintains its size. (Thus all movements between rms and between sectors are due to
exogenous separations and workers cannot choose, for example, which sector to move to,
or enter.) We assume there are a large number of workers relative to the number of rms,
and we normalize the ratio of workers to rms to be one in each sector and each period.8
We assume that the spot wage/full employment solution (N = 1) is always greater than
the unemployment consumption level, i.e., that @Fm=@N(1; st) > c all t:
The shock st follows a stochastic process taking a nite number of possible values,
and with initial value s1; which we specify in more detail below. Let ht  (s1; s2; : : : ; st)
be the history at t. The labour market o¤ers a worker currently looking for work in sector
m (at the start of t, discounted to t) of mt = 
m
t (ht): this is an average of the utility from
remaining unemployed and that from from getting a job where the weight depends on the
probability of being hired as described below. A rm must o¤er at least mt (ht) to prevent
its workers from quitting, and this is also the minimum utility that must be o¤ered to
hire: We assume that the rm can hire any number of workers by o¤ering at least mt
(and cannot hire otherwise). So the labour market is modelled as being competitive.
We summarise the timing as follows. At date 1 each rm in sector m o¤ers a single
state-contingent wage contract (wmt (ht))
T
t=1 to which it is committed. Workers then can
accept contracts and period 1 production takes place. At the end of period 1; a rm
loses a fraction (1   ) of its workforce due to exogenous separation, as described above.
At the start of each subsequent period t  2; rms and workers observe st. Workers
may quit costlessly at this point and join the pool of those previously separated, surviving
unemployed and new entrants to the sector, facing the same probability of employment (so
receive mt (ht)), but may not switch sectors. However, provided the continuation utility
o¤ered by the contract at least matches mt ; the rm is able to retain its sta¤ and hire in
as many new workers as it requires from the pool of those looking for work. Production
takes place and wages wmt (ht) are paid, and so on.
3.1 The Firms problem
We work with a representative rm in sector m. At the start of date 1; after s1 is observed,
as just stated, rms in each sector m commit to contracts (wmt (ht))
T
t=1, w
m
t (ht)  0, which
8While these di¤erent probabilities make the model rather involved, it turns out that under certain
conditions they do not matter for the equilibrium wage paths when downward rigidity is imposed. This
would not be true if workers were able to choose which sectors to enter, an extension we plan to make in
the future.
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we assume are not binding on workers. We assume equal treatment within the rm: a
worker joining subsequently, at  after history h , is o¤ered a continuation of this same
contract: (wmt (ht))
T
t= . (This is to be contrasted with the case where discrimination is
permitted where a worker joining at  would be o¤ered a contract which in principle
may be unrelated to that o¤ered to previous cohorts.) To avoid cluttering the notation,
we omit sector superscripts in what follows unless necessary (so an omitted superscript
implies that the sector is m). Let Vt (ht) denote the continuation utility from t onwards
from the contract, dened recursively by:
Vt (ht) = u(wt(ht)) + w[EVt+1 (ht+1) + (1)
(1  )t+1 +
X
m0 6=m
(M   1) 1 (1  )(1  )m0t+1 j ht];
with VT+1 = 0, where E denotes expectation, and the terms involving t+1 and 
m0
t+1 reect
the utility after exogenous separation but no death, if the worker respectively remains in
the same sector or moves to another sector. Each rm also has a planned employment
path (Nt(ht))
T
t=1, where Nt (ht)  0:
Note that in (1) it is assumed that there are no layo¤s, only exogenously determined
separations. Our aim is to construct an equilibrium in which layo¤s do not occur, largely
because it substantially simplies the analytics of the solution. In fact, we will state the
optimization problem below imposing no layo¤s, to avoid complicating the statement of
the problem, and later derive parameter restrictions for which this remains a solution even
if layo¤s are permitted.9
The problem faced by the rm, which takes the stochastic sequence of outside option
values in its sector, (t)
T
t=1 ; as parametric (as well as those in other sectors), is:
max
(wt(ht))
T
t=1;(Nt(ht))
T
t=1
E
"
TX
t=1
(f )
t 1 (Fm(Nt(ht); st) Nt(ht)wt(ht))
#
(Problem DWR)
subject to
Vt (ht)  t (ht) (2)
for all positive probability ht; T  t  1,
wt (ht 1; s)  b (ht 1; s)w (ht 1) ; (3)
9The details of this nal step are developed in Snell and Thomas (2009) and apply mutatis mutandis.
Given that the rate of separation is exogenous, it is changes in hiring that drive movements in unemploy-
ment in our model. This is consistent with Hall (2005b), who argues that the separation rate in the US
labor market is roughly constant (see also Pissarides (1986), Shimer (2005b)), and that although job losses
rise during recessions, the increase is usually very small in relation to the normal levels of separations.
However, these conclusions have been disputed (see Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009)).
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and
Nt(ht 1; s)  Nt 1(ht 1) (4)
for all positive probability ht 1; all s 2 S with st 1s > 0; T  t  2: (2) is the participation
constraint that says that at any point the contract must o¤er at least what a worker can
get by quitting, and (3) is the ad hoc downward constraint that imposes that wages cannot
fall at a rate faster than an amount which may depend on the current state (e.g., to capture
ination), given by b (ht). For b = 1 we have downward real wage rigidity, and for b = 0
we have the problem in which there is no downward constraint on wages. Downward
nominal rigidity would be captured by b(ht) = pt 1=pt, where pt is the price level at t
(prices play no other role in this model). Finally, (4) imposes that the rm may not layo¤
workers.10 We shall also consider a modied version of Problem DWR in which we ignore
the constraint (4); we refer to this as Problem DWR.
3.1.1 Equilibrium
We shall use a  superscript to denote equilibrium values.11 We are looking for symmetric
solutions, i.e., where all rms in a sector choose the same contract (though we do not
need symmetry across sectors). To close the model we impose an equation specifying the
equilibrium determination, given (wt (ht))
T
t=1 ; (N

t (ht))
T
t=1 ; of the outside option in sector
m:
t =
Nt   Nt 1
1  Nt 1
V t +
1 Nt
1  Nt 1
Ut; (5)
N0 = 0, where V

t is the equilibrium contract o¤er at t (the denominator is the number
of workers not retained after t  1; which equals the number seeking work at t, while the
numerator in the rst fraction is the number of hires at t). Ut is the discounted utility of
a worker who is unemployed at t which is given by
Ut(ht) = u(c) + w (1  (1  ) (1  )) (E

t+1 j ht

+X
m0 6=m
(M   1) 1(1  )E
h
m
0
t+1 j ht
i
); (6)
i.e., the utility from the reservation wage plus future utility assuming survival (with prob-
ability (1  (1  ) (1  ))) from not having a job at the beginning of t + 1. Given the
endpoint condition m
0
T+1 = 0, all m
0, (5), (1) and (6) uniquely determine Ut; V t and t.
10More precisely, (4) implies layo¤s are not needed. However the denition of Vt(ht) in (1) implies that
a worker remains with the rm unless exogenously separated, so together these two assumptions rule out
layo¤s.
11This subsection follows Snell and Thomas (2009), mutatis mutandis.
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Note that there are two cases: if the labour market in sector m at time t clears,
Nt (ht) = 1, then from (5) t (ht)must o¤er the utility o¤ered by other rms. In symmetric
equilibrium, other rms are o¤ering an identical contract, and so it is the utility associated
with this, V t (ht) ; which must be o¤ered. If, on the other hand, there is excess supply of
labour,12 Nt (ht) < 1, the outside opportunity will depend on the probability of getting a
job.
We can summarise:
Denition 1
 
w
m
t (ht)
T
t=1
; (Nmt (ht))
T
t=1
M
m=1
constitutes a symmetric (no layo¤) equi-
librium if it solves Problem DWR for each m where (mt )
T
t=1 is determined recursively from
(1), (5) and (6).
To proceed, we shall provisionally assume that rms always hire (at all ht) in equi-
librium. That is to say, we proceed on the supposition that the constraint (4) in problem
DWR never binds in the solution. We characterize the solution if this is the case, and later
nd conditions on a specic parametrization for which the solution satises this property.
Then employment is determined by a standard marginal productivity equation (again
suppressing sector superscripts):
Lemma 2 If in a symmetric equilibrium hiring takes place at every ht; then Nt (ht) sat-
ises
@F (Nt (ht); st)=@N = w

t (ht): (7)
Proof. Suppose that @F (Nt (ht); st)=@N > w

t (ht): It is feasible to increase current
hiring holding the wage contract constant, and consider this as the only change to the
rms plan: An increase in current hiring by  > 0, for  small enough, and holding the
wage constant at wt (ht), would lead to an increase in current prots. At the same time,
holding employment at t+1 constant at Nt+1(ht+1) in all states (so hiring falls by ), is
feasible for  small enough given hiring is positive at t + 1. Thus there is an increase in
prots at t; and no change at other dates, contradicting prot maximization. A symmetric
argument, using the fact that current hiring is positive so current hiring can be reduced
by ; and that t + 1 employment can be increased by , rules out @F (Nt (ht); st)=@N
< wt (ht):
12 Intuitively, the case of excess demand for labour cannot arise in equilibrium, as an innitessimally
small increase in the wage would cure the individual rms supply problem. In contrast, because of equal
treatment the case of excess supply can arise since workers cannot undercut.
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Suppose that at some t; the participation constraint binds. Then there must be full
employment and the wage is determined by marginal productivity at full employment:
Lemma 3 Consider a symmetric equilibrium in which hiring always occurs; then the par-
ticipation constraint binds at ht if and only if Nt (ht) = 1; moreover if the constraint binds
then wt (ht) = @F (1; st)=@N:
Proof. Suppose that Nt (ht) < 1: Under the hiring hypothesis, we know from Lemma
2 that @F (Nt (ht); st)=@N = w

t (ht) > c by the assumption on c and diminishing marginal
productivity (i.e., wt (ht)  c would imply Nt (ht) > 1). So a worker who fails to get a job
is strictly worse o¤, and thus V t (ht) >  (st) (cf. (5) and (6)) and so the participation
constraint does not bind. On the other hand, if Nt (ht) = 1 then from (5), V

t (ht) =  (st)
and the constraint binds. The equilibrium wage follows directly from Lemma 2.
We dene wms = @F
m(1; s)=@N; which in view of the above lemma is the equilibrium
wage when the participation constraint binds in state s, but note that it would also be
the wage in a spot version of the model.
The above is very useful as it tells us that if the contract wage is below the spot wage
for that state, we get employment above unity, which is infeasible. So this case cannot
occur. If wages are above the spot wage, there is unemployment, and so the participation
constraint cannot bind intuitively a worker who quits is bound to get less utility than
she would by not quitting because of the unemployment possibility.
To proceed to an explicit solution, and in order to facilitate the empirical analysis, we
put more structure on the problem.13 This will allow us to assert that the wage updating
rule in any sector m is of the following simple form: given wt compute wt+1 under the
hypothesis that the participation constraint at t + 1 is not binding; if wt+1 > wst+1 then
the hypothesis is conrmed and wt+1 is the equilibrium wage; otherwise the constraint is
binding and the equilibrium wage will be at wst+1 . The structure will also allow us to
demonstrate su¢ cient conditions for the symmetric hiring equilibrium to exist.
From henceforth assume each rm has technology given by, at time t,
Fm(N; st) =M
(m)
t + a
(m)
t N
1 =(1  ); (8)
for  6= 1, with Mt  0 and for  = 1, we specify Fm(N; st) = a(m)t log (N). (M
(m)
t ; a
(m)
t )
is a sector specic shock that depends on the aggregate shock st. Note that for  > 1,
13We also need the problem faced by the rm to be concave; concave production and utility functions
are not su¢ cient to guarantee this.
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Fm has an upper bound given by M (m)t , which given that we are modelling short-run
production functions at the establishment or plant level, may be appropriate. We assume
that productivity shocks are not too bad (again dropping sector superscripts):
at+1=at > 
 (9)
with probability one (for example, with a log production function, this requires only that
productivity does not fall at a rate equal to turnover; since the latter is typically estimated
in the region of 30% on an annual basis, this is a mild restriction). This will ensure in
the solution derived below, provided wages are su¢ ciently downward rigid, that rms will
always need to hire in new workers (rms always loose more workers through exogenous
turnover than they wish to), thus justifying our concentration on hiring equilibria. We also
assume henceforth that workers have per-period utility functions of the constant relative
risk aversion family with coe¢ cient  > 1 described by u(c) = c1 =(1   ).14 Assume
 > 1:
Under the hiring assumption, we also have that the marginal product of labour equals
atN
 
t , so that using (7),
Nt = a
1

t w
  1

t : (10)
Substituting Nt = 1 we nd that the spot wage is wt = at:
3.1.2 No uncertainty
First we deal with the case of no uncertainty (so that all sectoral productivity sequences
are known at date 1 before contracts are entered into). In this case, we show that the
wage will always be kept as low as possible subject to it never falling below the spot wage.
With downward real rigidity this would imply that the equilibrium satises w (ht) =
maxt0tw

st0
.
As a rst step towards proving this, we demonstrate a frontloading result. The lemma
establishes a very useful fact if the model is deterministic: provided the downward con-
straint is not too weak (for example, with nominal rigidity, provided ination is not too
large), then wages will fall between any two dates by the maximum allowed by the down-
ward constraint unless the participation constraint at the later date binds (we establish
this for the case where the constraint (4) is ignored).
The intuition is as follows: if wages next period are not up against the downward
constraint, then frontloading them by cutting next periods wage a small amount and
14For  = 1, set u(c) = log(c); all results go through.
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simultaneously increasing the current wage to compensate workers does not violate any
downward constraints. If in addition next periods participation constraint is not binding
then these too will be satised at all dates. This will increase prots however. The reason
is that because there is turnover a number of the current workforce will be separated
before next period to compensate workers the current wage does not have to be increased
too much as they discount the future wage by the probability of separation, in addition
to . The rm, however, puts greater weight on wages next period because it will have to
pay them to replacement workers (new hires) as well as to the surviving incumbents. Thus
the cut in future wages is valued more highly by the rm and prots rise. The argument
works so long as (a) wages are not falling too quickly, as then risk-averse workers will
need substantial additional compensation now for the steeper wage path, and (b) rms
are hiring in new workers. Thus the downward constraint must not have b(ht) too small,
and also negative productivity shocks should not be too severe so that rms want to hire
some workers each period, a condition we had already assumed in order to solve the model.
Lemma 4 Suppose there is no uncertainty. Then there exists a b < 1, such that if
b(ht+1) > b; all t, the following must hold: If in a solution for sector m to Problem
DWR(i.e., DWR without the no layo¤ constraint) the downward rigidity constraint does
not bind in sector m between t and t+ 1 then the participation constraint binds at t+ 1.
Proof. We use time subscripts rather than history dependent functions as there is
no uncertainty (and suppress sector m superscripts). Suppose to the contrary of the claim
wt > btwt 1 but the participation constraint does not bind at t + 1: Starting from the
optimal contract, consider reshu­ ing wages between t and t + 1 as follows: decrease the
wage at t + 1 by a small amount wt+1 > 0 so that worker utility falls by  > 0; and
increase the wage at t by wt so that utility rises by x; and so as to leave the worker
indi¤erent; do not change the contract otherwise. This implies that
 + x = 0 (11)
(where u0 (wt+1)wt+1 '  and u0 (wt)wt ' x). This frontloading satises all par-
ticipation constraints: worker utility falls at t + 1 but the constraint was initially slack
by hypothesis, and so from this point on constraints are satised; similarly, participa-
tion constraints are also satised both at t and earlier because utility is held constant
over the two periods. A su¢ ciently small change also satises the downward rigidity con-
straint because at t + 1 it was slack, while at t, wt + wt > wt  btwt 1; and at t + 2;
wt+1 wt+1 < wt+1  wt+2=bt+2. We write (ut; at) as the static prot function at pro-
ductivity level at (we can suppressMt which only shifts prots up or down; see (16) below
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for the explicit function) when workers receive a current-period utility of ut (= u (wt)),
and N (ut; at) for the corresponding optimal labour demand. Because we are ignoring the
constraint (4), the optimal contract must generate prots of (ut; at) at t (the choice of Nt
does not a¤ect the other constraints, so Nt must be chosen to maximise current prots at
the contract wage). The change in prots (viewed from ht) arising from the frontloading
is
P ' 0(ut+1; at+1) 0(ut; at)x (12)
Dene " := min2tT [ at+1=at   1], where, by (9), " > 0; so that
 at+1=at  1 + ": (13)
From Hotellings Lemma (converting wages to utilities), 0(u; a) =  N (u; a) =u0(w).
Thus,
0(ut; at+1)
0(ut; at)
=
N (ut; at+1)
N (ut; at)
=
a
1

t+1
a
1

t
  (1 + ")1= ; (14)
where the second equality follows from optimal labour demand N = a
1
w 
1
 (given that
ut and hence wages are constant in the ratio), and the inequality follows from (13).
Next, (; a) is a concave function: Consider the static problem of maximizing prots
given that workers receive utility u, so that w = ((1  )u)1=(1 ). Substituting from the
condition that the marginal product of labour equals the wage:
N = a
1
w 
1
 (15)
yields prots of
(u; at) Mt +
a
1

t  ((1  )u)
  1 
(1 )
1   : (16)
As  > 1, this is a strictly concave function of u.
Given that wages rise at a gross rate greater than b, then if  > 1 (so utilities are
negative; a similar argument, though with some inequalities reversed, applies for  < 1
and we omit it),
ut+1
ut
=

wt+1
wt
1 
< b1  : (17)
Then from (16),
0(ut+1; at+1)
0(ut; at+1)
=

ut+1
ut
  1
(1 )

> b(
 1
 ); (18)
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where the inequality follows from (17). Substituting (11) into (12) yields
P ' 0(ut+1; at+1) 0(ut; at)x
= 0(ut; at)

0(ut+1; at+1)
0(ut; at)
  

> 0(ut; at)

 (1 + ")1= b(
 1
 )   

where the inequality follows from (14) and (18). Thus, provided b  (1 + ") 
1
 1 ; P >
0. As the initial contract was assumed optimal, this is a contradiction. Given  > 1,
(1 + ")
  1
 1 < 1. Hence setting b = (1 + ") 
1
 1 ; the assertion of the lemma follows.
We can now show that wages rising by the minimum given by the downward con-
straint, unless this takes wages below the spot wage in which case the wage is set to the
latter, constitutes an equilibrium. We use a  to denote equilibrium values.
Proposition 5 Suppose there is no uncertainty and that b(ht) > b, all t. Then there is a
symmetric equilibrium in which in each sector m, wmt+1 = maxfb (ht+1)wmt ; amt+1g; t  2
and wm1 = a
m
1 :
Proof. Suppose all other rms follow the putative equilibrium strategy and hire so
that they are on their labour demand curves, i.e., marginal product of labour equal to
the wage (this denes (t)
T
t=1 from (5)) and consider the optimal strategy of a potential
deviant rm ignoring constraint (4), i.e., a solution to Problem DWR(which exists by
standard arguments) in sector m. We show that any optimal strategy must coincide with
the putative equilibrium strategy. Again we drop sector superscripts and write bt for b(ht).
(i) If at T; the nal wage in the deviant strategy wT < wT ; then if w

T = aT , there is full
employment and so to satisfy the participation constraint a wage wT  wT must be paid
(see the remark below Lemma 3), so the participation constraint would be violated by
the deviation strategy and it would be infeasible; on the other hand, if wT < aT , then
at t   1, wT 1 = wT =bT by denition of the equilibrium strategy, and wT < wT plus
downward rigidity implies wT 1  wT =bT < wT =bT , so the deviation contract o¤ers less
discounted utility at T   1: Again, if the participation constraint binds at T   1 for the
equilibrium contract, the participation constraint would be violated for the deviant, and
if it does not bind, we can extend the argument back to T   2; etc. As soon as the
participation constraint binds for the putative equilibrium contract (it must bind at t = 1
by w1 = a1; as this implies full employment in the sector and hence by (5) a binding
constraint), we will get a contradiction. (ii) If at T; wT > wT ; then the participation
constraint is slack for the deviant contract and so by Lemma 4 (recall we are looking at
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Figure 1: TFP (blue) and wage simulation (red)
an optimal deviation contract, i.e., a solution to Problem DWR), wT 1 = wT =bT and as
wT  bTwT 1, wT 1 > wT 1. If at T  1 the participation constraint binds for the deviant
contract, it would be violated for the equilibrium contract, which is impossible. Thus it
cannot bind at T   1, and we can work backwards to the point where it last binds for
the deviant (it must bind at least at t = 1 as otherwise cutting w1 would improve prots
without violating any constraint), at which point again the deviant strategy o¤ers higher
discounted utility, a contradiction. We conclude that wT = wT . By similar arguments we
can show wT 1 = wT 1; and work backward to establish equality of the two contracts.
Thus deviation is not protable.
Finally, since the optimal response to the putative equilibrium contract ignoring the
constraint (4) is to adhere to the equilibrium contract, it follows that the same is true
when (4) is imposed as it is satised in the putative equilibrium from (10) and (9).
To illustrate the solution, we take the actual productivity series for one of the man-
ufacturing sectors that we use in the empirical exercise (see Section 4 for details) and
impose full downward rigidity (b (ht) = 1); Figure 1 displays productivity and simulated
wages. The productivity level equals the spot wage, and Proposition 5 says that wages are
always at least at this level, and never fall. Whenever the wage lies above productivity,
the labor market fails to clear (and the participation constraint does not bind); the larger
the percentage gap, the larger is unemployment (as Nt = (wt=at)
  1
 ).
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3.1.3 Uncertainty
The above arguments do not generalise to the case of uncertainty. Lemma 4 may fail as
the frontloading of the wage contract between periods t and t + 1 in a particular state
may now a¤ect future wages in other possible states at t+ 1 the wage at t is increased,
so if the downward constraint binds in some other state at t+ 1 this will imply the wage
increases in that state, which may be costly. However, we can show that if T = 2 this
problem cannot arise. For simplicity assume b (h2) = 1 all h2 (downward real rigidity).
Proposition 6 If T = 2; and b (h2) = 1 all h2, there is a symmetric equilibrium in which
wt = maxt0tw

t0.
Proof. To establish this we convert the rms choice variable (contract) from wages
(wt(ht))
2
t=1 to utilities (ut(ht))
2
t=1. We can formulate Problem DWR
R faced by the rm
equivalent to problem DWR except we ignore the no layo¤ condition (4) as:
max
(ut(ht))
2
t=1
E
"
2X
t=1
()t 1(ut(ht); at)
#
(Problem AR)
subject to ~Vt (ht)   (ht) (19)
for all positive probability ht; 2  t  1, and
ut (ht 1; s)  u (ht 1) ; (20)
where ~Vt (ht) is dened recursively as before by:
~Vt (ht) = u(wt(ht)) + wE

Vt+1 (ht+1) + (1  )t+1 j ht

; (21)
with ~V3 = 0. The maximand is strictly concave (see the proof of Lemma 4) and the
constraints are linear. The Slater condition is satised by, for all ht, ut(ht) = u(w(ht)+"),
for " > 0. Moreover it is straightforward but tedious to show that the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions are satised at the putative equilibrium contract, hence the putative solution
solves Problem DWRR and moreover can be shown to satisfy positive hiring, and so this
must also be solution to Problem DWR which has the additional constraint (4).
For T  3 we can construct counterexamples to the putative equilibrium, but only if
there are shocks su¢ ciently bad that productivity falls in a range close to : We do not
have an analytical result however.15
15We simulated models with iid two-state multiplicative productivity processes up to T = 13: For
example, for  = :8, we conrmed the putative equilibrium for a wided range of other parameter values,
provided at+1=at was at least approximately :82 with probability one.
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4 Simulations
In this section we assess to what extent the model is consistent with some relevant labour
market stylised facts. In particular, in our rst exercise, we gauge whether the version
with downward real rigidity (we consider full downward rigidity and a weaker version) can
generate a plausible degree of unemployment volatility from measured total factor produc-
tivity shocks using US post war aggregate unemployment and TFP data from the Bureau
for Labor Statistics (BLS), and how well wage/unemployment regressions on simulated
data correspond to existing stylised facts. In a single sector, unemployment falls to zero
whenever the productivity shock is not too bad. Using the multisector model, however, in
which each sector will be assumed to be subject to an idiosyncratic productivity shock as
well as an aggregate shock, we will obtain more realistic unemployment levels because it is
less likely that all labour markets will simultaneously clear; moreover when the aggregate
productivity shock is positive, there will be more sectors with low unemployment and
consequently aggregate employment is likely to be lower. In our second exercise we use
actual sectoral manufacturing productivity shocks to generate unemployment data, and
compare this with the post-war US experience.
Given knowledge of the models parameters, given an initial time period where there
was full employment and given a TFP series it is possible to generate the sectoral real
wageseries that would be predicted by versions of our theory. We can only assert that
this is an equilibrium if there is no uncertainty, so each sectoral sequence is perfectly an-
ticipated, although as noted above, we conjecture that this is also an equilibrium with
uncertainty provided shocks are not too negative. It is then possible to derive the corre-
sponding implications for unemployment (rates), and also the relationship between real
wages and unemployment.
In accordance with the theory developed earlier,we generate for each sector separate
predicted wage and unemployment series, using simulated productivity sequences as devi-
ations around measured TFP data for the U.S. economy, 1949-2001, and then aggregate
(we start simulations at full employment and spot wages in 1949, allowing 6 years for
unemployment to develop in each sector). Recall that this involves asuming that each
sectoral labour market is segmented so we can compute unemployment in each sector
independently, and then aggregate.
We examine two distinct relationships between real wages and unemployment over
the business cycle. First, studies of real wage cyclicality have mainly looked at how
wages respond to contemporaneous unemployment movements. While there is a huge
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literature on this, a very rough summary would be that wages are roughly acyclical, or
mildly procyclical, with panel studies tending to suggest the latter. For example, using the
PSID for men over the period of 1968-69 to 86-87, Solon, Barsky, and Parker (Feb 1994)
found that a one percentage point reduction in the unemployment rate leads to a rise in
the real wage rate of 1.4 percent. Similar estimates are found in Shin (Oct 1994) and
Devereux (Jul 2001). From our simulations, we can regress real wage changes on changes
in unemployment to replicate the typical regression undertaken in the panel studies.
Most studies which use longitudinal data of real wage cyclicality have, following Bils
(1985), estimated the following:
 lnwit = Ut + t+ 
0Xit + "it; (22)
where  lnwit is the di¤erence between the natural logarithm of worker is real wage
rate in year t and his log real wage in year t   1, Ut is the year-to-year change in the
unemployment rate, andXit is a vector containing an intercept and time varying individual
characteristics. The equation also includes a linear time trend (i.e., a corresponding to a
quadratic in t in levels).
The second common regression relates wage levels to two lagged measures of unem-
ployment in addition to contemporaneous unemployment. Beaudry and DiNardo (1991)
test di¤erent versions of a contracting model, which leads to a di¤erent regression equa-
tion. Their general model can be expressed as follows: the natural log of the real wage for
worker j at time  + t for a worker who started the job at time  satises:
lnwj;+t = 1Xj;+t + 2C( ; t) + "j;+t (23)
where Xj;+t is a vector of individual variables, 1 is the vector of coe¢ cients on these
variables, "j;+t is an error term, and 2 is the coe¢ cient on the business cycle (i.e.,
unemployment) variable, with the 3 possibilities for the business cycle variable C( ; t)
being:
C( ; t) =
8><>:
U+t spot market model
U fully binding contract
minfU+k; k = 0; 1; : : : ; tg non-binding on worker
where the unemployment rate is denoted by U; with U the rate prevailing at the start
of the job and U+t the rate at time  + t where t denotes tenure with the employer.
They test these three models against each other on U.S. data (Panel Study on Income
Dynamics (PSID)/Current Population Survey (CPS)). The results are striking. In some
specications16 in which all three variables are included, the coe¢ cient on the minimum
16See Table 2 of their paper.
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unemployment rate is the only correctly signed (i.e., negative) signicant one (PSID, no
xed e¤ects), and in all specications it is much larger than the other coe¢ cients, implying
that a 1% drop in the minimum unemployment rate (e.g., from 4% to 3%) leads to an
increase in current wages of 3% or more. Several recent empirical studies have largely
conrmed the robustness of Beaudry and DiNardos main empirical ndings over di¤erent
periods and using di¤erent datasets, that the minimum rate of unemployment since hiring
is a statistically important determinant of the current wage of an individual (McDonald
and Worswick 1999, Grant 2003, Shin and Shin 2007, Devereux and Hart 2007), although
tending to nd a smaller size for the coe¢ cient. Both Grant (2003), and Devereux and
Hart (2007), nd more of a role for the current unemployment rate than did Beaudry and
DiNardo. Grant (2003) extends Beaudry and DiNardos analysis (using six cohorts from
the National Longitudinal Surveys) to cover the time period 1966 to 1998. He nds that
the signicance and importance of minu is broadly robust to the addition of a number of
extra variables.
We ran both regression equations (22) and (23) on our 47 years of simulated data.
Since all workers have identical productivity in our model, there are no distinguishing
individual characteristics. For (23), we included all three unemployment measures simul-
taneously, and started the regression in 1968, to allow workers to build up a su¢ cient
history (i.e., the number of workers of each entry vintage in a rm declines with tenure
due to the exogenous turnover).
To implement our simulations we need to calibrate , the parameter governing the
curvature of the production function. We consider di¤erent values: A value of 1.4 trans-
lates to a short-run elasticity of demand for labour of approximately -0.7. Estevão and
Wilson (1998) analyzing BLS manufacturing data for a similar period that we study, found
a short-run demand elasticity ranging between close to zero and -0.71 with aggregate data,
and of between -0.5 and -0.89 at the 4-digit industry level for manufacturing, although
Hamermesh (1993) reports that an elasticity of around  0:3 is typical. A lower value
for  will magnify uctuations in sectoral unemployment (e.g., if  was calibrated to the
labour share in income, assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function involving capital).
Note that the value of the risk aversion parameter, , does not a¤ect the solution (it is
relevant for the value of b; however). We also need to specify the productivity process in
each sector. We suppose that in each sector m, amt equals actual TFP (as measured by
the BLS for the U.S. economy) times an idiosyncratic component which is modelled as
an autoregressive (1) process with persistence of 0.9 and mean 1. We nd the variance
of this process to matter to our results (although the persistence does not appear to be
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signicant), so we report , the standard deviation of the growth rate in each sector.17 We
also need to calibrate ; the exogenous staying rate, in order to run the Beaudry-DiNardo
regression (as this determines the numbers of each entry cohort within each rm). We set
 = 0:7; corresponding to an annual turnover rate of 30%, which is a fairly typical value.
We ran the simulations for 100 sectors, and report mean values of coe¢ cients based on
100 simulations. (The reported coe¢ cients are almost always signicant in the simulated
regressions.) For most of the simulations we assume full downward rigidity, b(ht) = 1, but
we also allow a 3% and 5% fall per annum respectively, i.e., b(ht) = :97=:95; and also we
nally consider nominal downward rigidity.
The other question we look at is whether the model can generate su¢ cient degrees
of unemployment variability from the underlying process. Since the latter is based on
measured TFP, with a large number of sectors the aggregate TFP for our model economy
has a similar variability to the measured series (its growth rate has a standard deviation
over the sample of 2.3% when  = 13% compared with 1.7% for the underlying TFP
series). Thus, we report the variability of simulated aggregate unemployment.
Table 1 presents the results. Actual US Unemployment has a standard deviation
of 1.6% over our sample period. In most of our simulations, the model produces more
variability. On the other hand, in the simulations the real wage cyclicality coe¢ cient ( in
(22)), although it is consistently negative, is smaller in absolute value than that typically
found in recent longitudinal studies, which as already discussed, would suggest a value
closer to -1. Together these two observations suggest that there is somewhat too much
wage rigidity in the model. That the wage semi-elasticity of unemployment is negative
in the simulations is unsurprising with full downward rigidity, for example, wages only
change in a sector when there is full employment, in which case they rise. Aggregating
across sectors, a fall in unemployment will tend to be associated with more sectors having
full employment and consequently wages rising in more sectors.
The coe¢ cients on C( ; t) in (23), presented in the nal three columns of the table,
are often, in existing studies, incorrectly signed (i.e., positive) except for that on mini-
mum unemployment. What we nd is that all the reported calibrations produce negative
coe¢ cients on unemployment in (22), though again somewhat smaller than that in recent
studies. The coe¢ cients in (23) appear, however, to depend on the degree of sectoral
productivity variability. If this is su¢ ciently high, at  = 17% in the table, the coe¢ cient
on minimum unemployment is consistently negative,18 whereas the other two coe¢ cients
17But recall that while we use a random process to generate a sequence of productivity levels, we assume
that the sequence is perfectly anticipated.
18The reader might be puzzled as to how this is possible given that all workers are paid the same within
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Model Std Dev Wage Cycl. Min Unem. Start Unem. Curr. Unem.
of Unem Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient
 = 1:8;  = 13% 3.8% -0.3 -0.02 1.60 1.69
 = 1:8;  = 17% 4.8% -0.27 -0.59 2.20 1.56
 = 1:8;  = 5% 1.5% -0.50 2.84 -0.14 -2.14
 = 1:2;  = 17% 6.2% -0.13 -0.76 1.39 1.31
 = 0:7;  = 3% 2.0% -0.24 0.75 -0.44 -1.44
 = 1:8;  = 17%19 1.8% -0.50 -0.20 0.7 -0.83
 = 1:8;  = 22%20 1.7% -0.41 -1.01 0.43 -0.22
 = 1:8;  = 16%21 1.3% -0.37 -0.27 1.40 1.89
Table 1: Simulation Results
are incorrectly signed. This is what Beaudry and DiNardo found in some of their speci-
cations, although the size of the minimum unemployment coe¢ cient is lower than theirs.
However, when the variance of the shocks is reduced, we nd that the signs reverse. (This
is a robust nding across alternative parameterisations).
To get predictions that match better all the stylised facts simultaneously, we found
it necessary to relax full downward rigidity, and instead allow respectively 3% and 5%
p.a. falls (see the penultimate two rows in the table).22 As wages can fall, this lessens the
amount of unemployment that can develop in a sector, and with it, reduces the variability
overall of unemployment closer to the observed magnitude. Finally, in the bottom row,
we report results from downward nominal rigidity, but where we have put a maximum fall
in real wages of 5% . Again this produces good results, although the coe¢ cient on current
unemployment in (23) is positive and large, whereas recent results suggest that a negative
coe¢ cient is more reasonable.
To conclude: while the model is capable of reproducing, to an extent, empirically
established relationships between wages and unemployment, it requires a high degree vari-
ability of sectoral shocks, and such that aggregate unemployment is actually more variable
than is empirically plausible unless real wages can fall.
each rm and sector. The answer is that there is variabilty across sectors both of wages and also of
proportions employed in each cohort, since sectoral employment histories di¤er. This is true even of wages
at a xed date: running (23) at a single date produces similar results; this is consistent with Grant (2003),
who nds that the minimum unemployment term is robust to the inclusion of time dummies. See Martins,
Snell, and Thomas (2005) for further discussion of why the econometric signicance of the minumum
unemployment rate is not inconsistent with equal treatment models.
22Real wage falls in this region do not seem implausible. For example, Elsby (2009) charts the distribution
of real wage changes in the PSID over 1983-1992, a relatively low ination period (so surprise ination is
less likely to lead to unanticipated real wage falls); there is a spike around 2-4% for real wage falls, and they
rarely exceed about 6%. Likewise Christophides and Stengos (2003) nd from Canadian wage contract
data in the unionized sector that most real wage reductions in the 1990s were of the order of 1-2%.
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In a second exercise, rather than simulating a number of sectors and specifying a
process for the deviation of sectoral shocks from the economy wide TFP level, we use actual
U.S. manufacturing industry multifactor productivity processes for the 17 manufacturing
sectors provided by the BLS for the period 1949-2001,23 and then aggregate the models
predicted unemployment for each of these sectors using mid-period unemployment shares
as weights.24 This xes the variability of shocks and their correlation across sectors, and
also allows us to generate a simulated unemployment series which can be directly compared
to the data. None of our theoretical results depended on the sectors being of the same
size, so our results readily extend to this asymmetric case; indeed allowing sector sizes
to vary over time would also be a straightforward extension although we assume they
remain constant for the simulations. We consider the case of full downward real rigidity;
this means that there is only one degree of freedom, the choice of  the curvature of
the production function. In the gure, we use a logarithmic production function ( = 1).
However it should be remarked that as manufacturing is only a fraction of the entire
economy (and becoming smaller over time), comparing the predicted unemployment rate
for our model manufacturing economy with the general unemployment rate, as we do,
is inappropriate. Nevertheless, the value of  essentially determines only the extent to
which a non-market clearing wage translates into unemployment; it does not a¤ect the
equilibrium wage path but only magnies the unemployment uctuations as it falls in
size. Thus if the remaining economy was composed of a residual sector with constant
unemployment, the similar uctuations in the economy wide unemployment rate would
result from choosing a lower value for : The results are presented in Figure 2.
Given there is only one degree of freedom (together with an assumed constant frici-
tional rate of unemployment which shifts the simulated series up or down), the simulation
tracks unemployment surprisingly well until towards the end of the simulation. Allowing
wages to fall somewhat reduces simulated unemployment particularly towards the end of
the simulation. What seems to be happening in the displayed case is that some sectors
experience a su¢ ciently long trend of poor productivity shocks that unemployment in
those sectors builds up with completely downward rigid wages, but this does not happen
with some degree of exibility. It is clearly unrealistic to suppose that labour wouldnt
in the long-run move out of these sectors, so even if downward rigidity was appropriate
we should expect to see lower unemployment towards the end of the period than the
23This is the only sectoral TFP series available for such a long time scale and collected on a consistent
basis.
24As before we run the model for 6 years starting from full employment in each sector, to allow unem-
ployment to evolve; so again we have simulations for 1955-2001. We add 3.5% to represent a constant
frictional rate.
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Figure 2: Unemployment simulations (solid line) and actual annual US rate (broken line),
1955-2001
simulation suggests.
The simulation of this second exercise does not possess su¢ cient sectoral productivity
variability to generate reasonable wage regression coe¢ cients, particularly for the Beaudry-
DiNardo regressions. One resolution, to be postponed for future work, might be to add
idiosyncratic rm shocks within each sector, as variation in the hiring rates over time
are important for the outcome. And we know that at the rm level, there is substantial
variability as far as labour ows are concerned (Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996)).
Finally, we note that broadly similar unemployment simulations as in our second
exercise were obtained in Snell and Thomas (2009). However, there, to avoid wages falling
too fast, it was necessary to either assume that workers are very risk averse (formally,
as worker risk-aversion tends to innity the solution converges to our model with full
downward rigidity (and even with uncertainty the simple characterisation obtains), or
that workers discount the future less than rms, or it was necessary to augment the model
with heterogenous worker turnover rates. In addition there were a number of degrees of
freedom in terms of parameter values compared to the current model. What this paper
suggests, nevertheless, is that introducing an independent source of downward rigidity
avoids having to make these assumptions.
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5 Concluding Comments
This paper has analysed a model with downward rigidities in which rms cannot pay
discriminate based on year of entry to a rm. We solved for the dynamics of wages and
unemployment under conditions of downward wage rigidity, where forward looking rms
take into account these constraints. We found that the equilibrium could be solved for
under conditions of certainty. Using simulated and actual productivity data based on the
post-war US economy, we analysed the ability of the model to match certain stylised labour
market facts, and found that it was able to generate su¢ cient variability of unemployment,
but could only match other stylised facts when full downward rigidity is relaxed somewhat.
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